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___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Abstract. Across different industries, we observe the emer-
gence of industry standard-setting organizations (SSO) that 
focus on the creation of industry-specific process standards. 
Firms adopt a strategy of co-opetition, the combination of co-
operation and competition, during standards development. We 
propose that a firm’s co-opetition strategy is revealed to some 
extent by when it elects to participate in an industry SSO. 
Bayesian information updating offers an effective empirical 
modeling perspective for studying firms’ participation strate-
gies when managers’ beliefs and uncertainties are factored into 
their decision-making. We analyze a panel data set of 73 U.S. 
public firms over a 20-year period. These firms are members of 
the TeleManagement Forum, an information, communications 
and entertainment industries SSO. We study organizational 
characteristics of member firms to understand how they relate 
to a firm’s SSO participation strategy, thus capturing the co-
opetitition dynamics of firms in the presence of process stan-
dardization. SSO participation strategies of firms do change as 
an industry SSO matures and as more information is gradually 
revealed. Additionally, there is a positive relationship between 
a firm’s likelihood to participate and announcements of key 
process-related events. The participation dynamics show more 
change in the beginning, but eventually stabilize over time. 
Keywords: Bayesian information updating, co-opetition, com-
petitive strategy, processes, standard-setting organizations. 
______________________________________________ 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, one of the key objectives of firms 
has been standardized processes. One of the driving 
forces for industry process standards is the chance to 
reduce costs via process outsourcing [10]. Process stan-
dards support software vendors in delivering a unified 
procurement strategy for enterprise software [28]. R&D 
cooperation also leads to cost reduction [27]. Standards 
reduce the chance of vendor lock-in. Also, collective 
action by mid-size vendors enables them to compete with 
larger vendors. Larger vendors, meanwhile, may pursue 
proprietary standards to cripple competing standards. 
Because such a wide variety of firm objectives is 
present, an industry-wide process standard takes several 
years to develop and requires the cooperation of various 
stakeholders within the industrial community. New stan-
dards can impact a firm’s competitiveness, its timing of 
participation in an industry standard-setting organization 
(SSO) becomes critical. 1  For example, small vendors 
recognize that standards can hinder and promote their 
chances to benefit from extreme differentiation. Teece’s 
                                                 
1 A group that develops and publishes industry standards is also 
called a standards development organization (SDO). 
[41] profiting from innovation framework suggests that 
success at innovation is strongly related to management’s 
market entry timing decisions, and is also dependent on 
the value appropriability regime that is in place. 
A firm’s SSO participation strategy during standards 
development reflects elements of co-opetition. Branden-
burger and Nalebuff [4, pp. 4-5] define co-opetition as 
combining “the advantages of both competition and co-
operation into a new dynamic which can be used to not 
only generate more profits but also to change the nature 
of the business environment in your favor.” Co-opetition 
strategy is observed in various settings across multiple 
industries, and can be differently employed by heteroge-
neous firms. For example, rivals, Microsoft and Apple, 
have partnered where both firms can experience financial 
and competitive gains [5]. In the auto industry, Peugeot, 
Citroen and Toyota have partnered to design cars so they 
can be manufactured on a shared platform [15]. It is 
common for competing technology vendors to cooperate 
on standards when they can mutually benefit. IBM has 
been known to adopt SAP’s standard, for example [26]. 
With co-opetition, firms send signals to other firms. 
SSO participation is one of the signals a firm can send, 
along with its level of participation (i.e., in a passive role 
as an observer, or in an active role as a board member), 
as is the formation of alliances. A firm that does not want 
its objectives revealed immediately or wishes to avoid 
the risks associated with early participation may delay 
entry. On the other hand, future payoffs for early partici-
pation may be higher than immediate payoffs since a 
firm is able to exert greater influence while a standard is 
still young. Thus, competing firms will be strategic when 
determining their timing for cooperation and entry into 
an industry SSO. Clemons and Knez [8] offer reasons 
why firms adopt both offensive and defensive strategies 
for IS innovation in introducing key elements of timing 
and cooperation in strategic IS decision-making. 
An SSO can also send signals by hosting annual 
events or publishing announcements in the form of press 
releases, product documents and customer case studies. 
As an SSO matures, more information becomes availa-
ble. When managers acquire new knowledge, they often 
adjust their strategies. Each player adopts different tac-
tics depending on its competitive position and overall 
goals. 2 Understanding how firm participation strategies 
                                                 
2 Tactics involve a procedure or a set of maneuvers that are 
used to achieve a particular goal.  
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 unfold during process standardization can empower 
managers to improve their decision-making regarding 
future strategies for industry SSO participation. 
We know from our multi-year field study that moti-
vations of firms vary for industry SSO participation. 
Salman Mahmood, CEO of Averox Inc., joined the TM 
forum because “its [activities] offer our company excep-
tional opportunities and events to gather up to date in-
formation on emerging needs in our industry and to meet 
with many of our industry’s key policy and decision 
makers” [2]. For Willy Ross, managing director of Data-
Synapse, the TM Forum provided a chance to “shape 
virtualization standards in the industry” [9]. A number of 
theoretical perspectives have been offered to explain why 
firms participate early, late, or not at all, including ven-
dor influences on firm switching costs [7], firm efficien-
cy differences and R&D intensity [22], and firm evalua-
tion of incumbents’ staying power in the marketplace 
[11], among others. 
The presence of co-opetition strategy is stronger 
within an industry SSO because there is one body that 
supports the process standard for its entire industry, 
which is unlike a consortium that spans multiple indus-
tries. Since competing firms heterogeneously determine 
their optimal timing for standards cooperation, a firm’s 
timing for entry can reflect its co-opetition strategy to 
some extent. Our goal is to understand the link between 
firm strategy for SSO participation and certain organiza-
tional characteristics. We achieve this using a Bayesian 
information updating analysis model.  
We ask: How does the relationship between firm 
characteristics and industry SSO participation strategies 
change as an SSO matures and as information is gradual-
ly revealed? We also explore: How does co-opetition 
explain a firm’s timing for SSO participation? How can a 
Bayesian information updating analysis model support 
the study of co-opetition in our context? 
We use Bayesian analysis, also known as Bayesian 
dynamic models [1, 17], to capture the changing dynam-
ics of interest. When studying environments of uncer-
tainty where managers’ beliefs are factored into their 
decision-making, Bayesian models offer an effective 
approach. Harsanyi [24] uses Bayes theorem to study 
games with incomplete information, where firms, as 
players, lack full information about other players or their 
own payoff function. In our study, the firms face a simi-
lar challenge; they cannot fully determine a priori what 
the outcomes will be should they participate early, mid, 
or late. Using Bayesian analysis, we can obtain a post-
erior distribution of the probability that a firm will partic-
ipate at a particular time, so we can model the changing 
SSO participation strategies of firms as an SSO matures. 
Managers’ intuition and previous experience represent 
the initial state of information. As more information be-
comes available, managers will factor new knowledge 
into their decision-making.  
Our empirical study uses membership data from the 
TeleManagement (TM) Forum, an information, commu-
nications and entertainment industries standards organi-
zation. The TM Forum founded the Business Process 
Framework (the Telecom Operations Map, TOM, and 
later the enhanced version, eTOM), a de facto industry 
standard for business processes. We study 73 U.S. public 
firms over a 20-year period, from the time of the organi-
zation’s birth in 1988 to 2007. In §2, we explore the co-
opetition theory to shed light on tactics firms use in the 
game of business and apply these ideas to our context. 
We also explore the importance of firm characteristics in 
explaining participation strategies. Further, we survey 
the literature to understand how the Bayesian approach 
has been used in studies of managerial decision-making 
to illustrate its relevance in our context. We present our 
methodologies in §3 and discuss our data and empirical 
model in §4. We provide our results and discussion in 
§5. §6 concludes with contributions and limitations. 
2. THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Managers form decisions in the presence of uncer-
tainty and incomplete information. Their strategies are 
not fixed; on the contrary, they often will change as 
managers acquire new knowledge. This behavior is ob-
served in firms’ participation strategies in industry SSOs.  
2.1. Co-opetition Theory and the Tactics Element 
 Brandenburger and Nalebuff [4] describe co-
opetition in game-theoretic terms as a strategy that a firm 
can use to change the competitive terms in its business 
environment through five elements. One of the elements 
is tactics. In competition, it is difficult for a firm to an-
ticipate what other players’ next move will be. Each time 
a player makes a move, it alters the actions of other 
players. Players use tactics or actions to lift, preserve, or 
stir up a new “fog.” An SSO’s role is to lift it. The objec-
tive is to grow the organization and promote the devel-
opment of standards by putting information out to the 
public. The perception of an SSO is that it is a value 
creator. For technology vendors, early participation can 
project perceptions of leadership when it comes to stan-
dards development. Technology vendors frequently em-
ploy different standards strategies [7]. As Brandenburger 
and Nalebuff indicate, what a firm chooses to do or not 
do sends signals to other players. At the same time, the 
free-rider problem can occur when risk-averse firms are 
reluctant to invest. Weiss and Cargill [45] note that for a 
firm to benefit from a standard, direct contribution is not 
required. Thus, we expect to see higher firm participa-
tion as a standard matures. 
For some firms, concealing information represents 
another key strategy. Brandenburger and Nalebuff [4] 
suggest that firms try to “preserve a fog” by hiding in-
formation. Hence, a firm that wishes to keep its stan-
dards strategy hidden may prefer later participation. 
This, however, does not suggest that firms are fully ex-
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 posed once they join an SSO. Firm participation does not 
necessarily equate to standards adoption. Part of the val-
ue in joining an industry SSO is the knowledge that one 
gains as a member. Having visibility of the activities that 
are occurring within a firm’s industry can lead to poten-
tial competitive advantage. Firms can also use complexi-
ty to “stir up a fog” [4], since firms are often not transpa-
rent in their strategies; unpredictability is the key to ef-
fectiveness. Firms often react to the tactics of other 
firms, especially if another firm is a direct competitor. 
When a primary competitor has joined an SSO, would a 
firm follow suit immediately, or sit back and observe a 
while longer?  
 Under the situations described, it is easy to see how 
one firm’s SSO participation strategy can easily influ-
ence the strategies of other firms. Numerous players are 
involved in the development of an industry standard, 
with the industry SSO itself as one of the key players. 
An SSO serves as the primary source for announcements 
and possesses the power to shape the perceptions of 
firms within its industry. For example, firms are likely to 
react when an SSO announces that a dominant player in 
the industry has joined the organization. Additionally, if 
a large technology user firm joins, technology vendors 
may be motivated to participate. After all, early partici-
pants play a major role in shaping a standard. We have 
yet to see much literature on how co-opetition strategies 
unfold in the presence of process standardization. As a 
result, it would be interesting and valuable for managers 
and researchers to understand how participation patterns 
of firms change as an industry SSO matures.  
2.2. Firm Characteristics vs. Firm Strategies 
Firm characteristics provide insights into firm strat-
egies. For our study, we selected characteristics that can 
explain both a firm’s cooperative and competitive strate-
gy. The characteristics include R&D intensity, employee 
efficiency, firm size, organizational slack (with net in-
come as a proxy), and senior management’s experience 
(via firm age) to understand firms’ strategies for SSO 
participation.  
Gupta et al. [22], in a cross-sectional study, reveal 
how production efficiency and R&D intensity impact 
SSO participation. We have the opportunity to examine 
the same variables with panel data. Others have looked at 
production efficiency in different contexts of corporate 
strategies. Smith et al. [39] show that a firm’s financial 
characteristics, such as employee efficiency, are able to 
explain its propensity to outsource IS. How does em-
ployee efficiency affect firms’ SSO participation strate-
gies? Firm size, which offers a firm certain advantages 
and limitations, can influence the strategies it employs. 
Thong [44] reports that firm size has a direct effect on IS 
adoption. Small firms face constraints of resource pover-
ty, while resource availability allows large firms to foster 
innovation adoption [12]. These limitations and advan-
tages associated with firm size either impede or promote 
SSO participation.  
Another characteristic that we explore is organiza-
tional slack, commonly measured by a firm’s net in-
come. Organizational slack has an impact on firm sustai-
nability and performance [29]. Firms with slack re-
sources are able to extend beyond core business objec-
tives to be involved in cooperative activities [38]. Final-
ly, we look at management experience, which we meas-
ure by the age of the firm. Management experience has a 
strong relationship to firm strategies. Inexperienced firms 
find cooperative behavior attractive because they can 
gain efficiency through partnership [37]. A manage-
ment’s prior experience with IT can influence IT adop-
tion and use [30]. More experienced firms participate in 
multiple SSOs and generally have the financial resources 
to be able to join earlier. They are better equipped with 
the knowledge to drive standards development and han-
dle the uncertainties that are present during early stages 
of development. Table 1 summarizes these studies. 
Table 1. Studies on Organizational Characteristics 
CONSTRUCT STUDY 
R&D Intensity R&D intensity provides insight into firms’ like-
lihood of SSO participation [22] 
Employee  
    Efficiency 
Efficiency reveals a firm’s propensity to out-
source IS [39] 
Firm Size Firm size has a direct effect on IS adoption [44] 
Organizational  
    Slack 
Firms leverage organizational slack to achieve 
sustainability and performance [29] 
Management  
    Experience  
Experience with IT influences IT adoption and 
use [30] 
2.3. The Bayesian Perspective in the Strategy Context 
 We have chosen to explore SSO participation from a 
Bayesian information updating perspective. Bayes theo-
rem focuses on the revision of the probability of some 
outcome based on observations of the world over time. 
People tend to revise their decisions based on newly-
acquired information. There are multiple perspectives 
when it comes to studies of decision-making. Smith and 
von Winterfeldt [40] indicate that probability theory and 
Bayesian statistics provide the normative foundation in 
the domain of judgment and beliefs. Raiffa and Schlaifer 
[35] have provided some of the earliest works using 
Bayesian statistics in studies of decision analysis. Har-
sanyi [24] used a Bayesian perspective to explore player 
strategies in games with incomplete information. He re-
veals that expectations can be represented by subjective 
probability distributions.  
So how does all of this relate to our study? Some 
level of uncertainty is always present in the execution of 
business strategy. During standards development, firms 
do not know a priori how long it will take a standard to 
gain industry-wide acceptance. At the start of the game, 
they do not know which firms, beyond the founding 
members, have an interest in the standard. Consider a 
firm that has decided the optimal time for entry into an 
3
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 SSO is after a de facto standard has come into existence. 
However, as the firm is waiting for the standard to reach 
that status, it may learn that its major competitors have 
taken an interest in the developing standard and have 
decided to join the SSO. At that point, senior manage-
ment may reevaluate its original strategy and decide that 
it is in the firm’s best interest to join now because any 
further delay in participation may create competitive 
disadvantage. As a result, the original probability of 
when the firm would join has changed. Note the firm 
may not have the same reaction if the joining firms are 
from a different stakeholder category. Players will up-
date their probabilities based on the types of players that 
join the game, as well as whatever information is re-
vealed during the course of the game [24]. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
We use Bayesian semi-parametric survival analysis, 
a Bayesian version of the Cox proportional hazards mod-
el, in our study. While survival analysis is often used in 
epidemiological studies, we are seeing its recent uses in 
studies of technology adoption and diffusion. By taking a 
Bayesian approach, we are able to estimate time-varying 
coefficients and show the impact of each independent 
variable on firm participation as an SSO matures. 
3.1. Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
The Cox proportional hazards model, a semi-
parametric survival analysis model, is the most popular 
model for survival data. The Cox model is used to study 
the occurrence of an event. In our context, the event is a 
firm’s entry into an industry SSO. The Cox model makes 
a parametric assumption regarding the predictors’ effects 
on the hazard function, but no assumption on the nature 
of the hazard function h(t) itself [23]. Firm characteris-
tics, including R&D intensity, employee efficiency, firm 
size, net income and age of the firm, serve as indicators 
of its likelihood for survival. Duration refers to the 
amount of time that goes by before a new firm joins; it is 
measured by the age of the SSO, with its birth in 1988 as 
the reference point. The age of the SSO also represents 
the maturity of the standards organization. As an SSO 
matures, information is revealed, and managers will ad-
just their participation strategies based on it. 
All of the firms eventually became members of the 
TM Forum. Therefore, censoring, which refers to cases 
where the event occurred prior to the study or never oc-
curred during the period of the study, is not of concern. 
The probability that a firm, which has not participated up 
to time t, chooses to participate at time t is called the 
hazard rate. The hazard rate helps us to establish evi-
dence for co-opetition strategy. The survival function is 
the probability a firm will participate at time t or later. A 
firm’s hazard rate is hi (t, xit, β) = h0(t) exp(β  xit) where 
h0(t) is the baseline hazard for firm i at age t, and xit is the 
vector of time-varying explanatory variables for firm i at 
age t. The parameters to estimate are β. Using the hazard 
rate, we can obtain a partial likelihood function for the 
data and parameter estimates using the maximum like-
lihood estimator [31].  
3.2. Bayesian Information Updating Model 
We extend the Cox model to create a semi-paramet-
ric Bayesian model. The Cox model assumes a propor-
tional hazard, which means that the effect of the inde-
pendent variables remains constant over time. Our use of 
the Schoenfeld residuals test [43] confirms that its prima-
ry assumption is met. The Cox model reveals an aggre-
gate effect over time, which is a key limitation when 
studying the lifetime of an industry SSO. It fails to leve-
rage the explanatory power of senior management’s 
processing of new information that a semi-parametric 
Bayesian model offers. This kind of analysis has been 
applied in studies of income dynamics [25], marketing 
[36], and survival data [17]. The methodology has not 
been widely explored in IS literature; however, it is be-
ginning to emerge. Banerjee et al. [1] leveraged a Baye-
sian model to examine the impacts of industry, firm and 
e-commerce factors on Internet firm survival. 
With a Bayesian information updating model, we 
can reveal time-varying coefficients and observe rela-
tionships between explanatory variables and changes in 
firm participation over time. It allows us to model un-
known distributions without resorting to strong parame-
tric assumptions. The Bayes theorem focuses on obtain-
ing the posterior distribution p(θ | y) [19]. The probability 
distribution for θ  is based on the prior distribution π (θ) 
and is updated by combining information from the prior 
distribution and the data through the calculation of the 
posterior distribution p(θ|y): p(θ, y) = p(y|θ)π(θ) /∫ 
p(y|θ)π(θ)dθ. The likelihood function for θ is any func-
tion proportional to p(θ |y). Bayes theorem enables us to 
update existing knowledge with new information, as 
represented by these expressions.  
SAS supports Bayesian analysis of the Cox model 
via WinBugs (for Bayesian inference using Gibbs sam-
pling) [32]. The PHREG procedure in SAS uses the 
Gibbs sampler to generate a chain of posterior distribu-
tion samples to sample each parameter value from its full 
conditional distribution. The Gibbs sampler is used 
when the conditional distribution for each variable is 
known but not the joint distribution [18]. The Gibbs 
sampling algorithm generates an instance from the distri-
bution of each variable, conditional on the current values 
of the other variables, so that each parameter is updated 
by treating all other parameters as fixed. As part of the 
process, we run thousands of iterations and obtain a new 
set of values for all the parameters after each of the itera-
tions. Extending the Cox model so that the β  coefficients 
vary across time t, our hazard function is hi (t, xit, β) = 
h0(t) exp(β  xit). 
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 4. DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
We next discuss our data and empirical model.  
4.1. Data Collection 
Our data consist of 73 U.S. public firms from 1988 
to 2007. They are members of the TeleManagement 
(TM) Forum (www.tmforum.org). Over the last 21 years, 
the TM Forum expanded globally, and it currently has 
over 700 member companies in 75 countries. Our sample 
includes stakeholder groups: analysts, technology users, 
system integrators, and technology vendors. Vendors 
include network equipment suppliers and software sup-
pliers. Technology users consist of the following subca-
tegories: service provider, network operator, mo-
bile/wireless operator, cable/multiple system operator, 
consumer electronics and media/entertainment. Table 2 
shows the number of annual new participants for each 
stakeholder category. We collected firm characteristics 
data from the COMPUSTAT North America database.  
Table 2. Annual Number of New Participants 
 YEAR 
 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 
Analyst           
User 1 1     1    
System 
Integrator 
 1        1 
Vendor 2 1   1  4 2 2 4 
Total 3 3 0 0 1 0 5 2 2 5 
 YEAR 
 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 
Analyst          1 
User 1 2 1   2 2 1 5 3 
System 
Integrator 
1  1 1    1   
Vendor 2 3 4 3 1 4 10 2 1 4 
Total 4 5 6 4 1 6 12 4 6 8 
Note: We excluded four firms due to differences in their currencies. 
4.2. Variables 
The dependent variable is AgeSSO, the age of the 
TM Forum at the time of a firm’s entry. The independent 
variables that we study are as follows. FirmAge, as a 
proxy for firm maturity and management’s experience, is 
measured based on the firm’s age at the time of its SSO 
entry. FirmSize is the annual number of employees. 
R&DIntensity is calculated by taking the firm’s annual 
R&D spending divided by its annual revenue. NetIncome 
is a proxy for organizational slack. EmpEfficiency is em-
ployee efficiency, as revenue / number of employees. 
Table 3 summarizes the dependent and independent va-
riables. Tables 4 and 5 provide descriptive statistics. 
4.3. Empirical Model 
Our hazard rate hi(t) model for firm i at age t is: 
    hi(t) = h0(t) exp[β1t R&DIntensityit + β2t NetIncomeit  
      + β3t FirmSizeit + β4t FirmAgeit +β5t EmpEfficiency it]  
where βkt , k = {1,…,5} are the time-varying coefficients. 
Using an autoregressive model, AR1, the β values are 
updated. The model is βkt = ϕβkt-1 + εkt , k = {1,…,5}, 
where ϕ are the parameters and εkt is a white noise 
process with zero mean and variance σ 2 [21].  
Table 3. Definitions of Model Variables 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Dependent variable 
AgeSSO Age of TM Forum when firm joined 
Independent variables 
FirmAge Maturity of firm based on age (in years) 
FirmSize Number of employees (in thousands) 
R&DIntensity R&D spending (in millions) / revenue (in millions) 
NetIncome Net income (in millions), proxy for org. slack 
EmpEfficiency Revenue / number of employees (as above) 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Variables, 73 Firms  
VARIABLE MEAN STD  DEV MIN MAX 
R&DIntensity     0.128              0.192   0             2.55 
NetIncome  871.81      3,698 -38,468    14,065 
FirmSize     52.43            78.14 0.023         386.56 
FirmAge     24.44            25.92   -6         129 
EmpEfficiency   291.78          155.09         36.45       1573 
Note: The age of a firm can be a negative value if the founders of the 
firm joined the TM Forum before establishing their company.  
Table 5. Correlation Matrix, 73 Firms  
 R&D 
Intensity 
Net 
Income 
Firm 
Size 
Age 
Firm 
Emp 
Efficiency 
R&DIntensity     1.0  -0.078   -0.260* -0.157* -0.154* 
NetIncome    -0.078   1.0    0.442*  0.173*  0.172* 
FirmSize   -0.260*  0.442*    1.0  0.576*     -0.018 
FirmAge   -0.157*   0.173*    0.576*   1.0 0.100* 
EmpEfficiency   -0.154*   0.172*   -0.018   0.100*       1.0 
Note: Signif. * = p < 0.05. No pair-wise correlations are of concern. 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
To obtain posterior distributions for the parameters, 
we used the Gibbs sampler. It generates random va-
riables from a distribution [6] and uses Markov chain 
Monte Carlo methods, a class of simulation algorithms. 
We ran chains with 5,000 burn-in and 10,000 after burn-
in iterations to check convergence. Burn-in refers to the 
practice of discarding an initial portion of a Markov 
chain sample so that the effect of initial values on the 
posterior inference is minimized. Inferences based on 
non-converged Markov chains can be inaccurate and 
misleading. We used the Geweke test to validate estima-
tion model convergence to establish the parameter esti-
mates [20]. We checked for high sample autocorrela-
tions, since they can result in biased Monte Carlo stan-
dard errors [14]. 
5.1. Bayesian Information Updating Model Results 
It is important for us to establish our approach to the 
interpretation of the Bayesian analysis results, since the 
methodology produces many coefficient estimates, as 
opposed to just one, and for which it might be possible to 
ascribe a number of different significance levels. The key 
insight is that the results need to be understood for the 
estimated impact patterns they suggest, as opposed to the 
specific values of any single coefficient estimate. 
5
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 Our study of firm characteristics and industry SSO 
participation strategies reveals that all of the variables 
except employee efficiency exhibit a distinct pattern. As 
time progresses and the industry SSO matures, the coef-
ficients begin to stabilize. Most of the changes in SSO 
participation strategies occur in the early years when the 
process standard is still in development mode. We next 
explore the SSO participation patterns for each firm cha-
racteristic as a means of getting a reading on the extent 
of the evidence of co-opetition strategies. 
Coefficients for the Bayesian analysis model are re-
ported in Table 6.3 This style of results presentation is 
consistent with exploratory data analysis for patterns and 
aids us in making the incremental year-by-year informa-
tion revelation and managerial responses plain. For each 
coefficient, its 2.5, 5, 50, 95 and 97.5 posterior distribu-
tion percentiles are displayed. Since no firms joined in 
1990, 1991 and 1993 (Years 3, 4 and 6 in our data set), 
no results are reported. Coefficients can only be esti-
mated for years in which at least one new firm joined the 
SSO. For 1988, 1989 and 1992 (Years 1, 2 and 5), the 
results did not converge to yield parameter estimates and 
the coefficients are not reported. This leaves us with 
coefficient estimates for 1994 to 2007 (Years 7 to 20) for 
the five variables we studied. We previously showed in 
Table 1 the number of new SSO participants for each 
year. We use box plots to display the posterior distribu-
tion results in Figure 1. 
The relationship between R&DIntensity and the ha-
zard rate experienced the most change from 1994 to 1999 
(Years 7 to 12). It was positive in 1994 and 1995 (Year 7 
and 8), became negative in 1996 and 1997 (Year 9 and 
10), and increased in 1998 (Year 11) to a positive value 
in 1999 (Year 12). Beginning in 1999, it remained steady 
and was mostly positive all the way through to 2007 
(Year 20). A positive coefficient shows that firms with 
higher R&D intensity are more likely to participate.  
In the years that the TM Forum experienced an in-
crease in the hazard rate of adoption, there were major 
developments in the process standard. The likelihood of 
SSO participation increased in 1998 and 1999 (Years 11 
and 12). In 1998, the TM Forum announced the first 
official version of the business process framework TOM. 
In the following year, the TM Forum announced TOM 
Version 2, the version that eventually became the indus-
try de facto standard. Starting in 1999 (Year 12), the re-
lationship between R&DIntensity and the hazard rate 
began to stabilize. 
The relationship between NetIncome and the hazard 
rate was positive for all the years except 2002 (Year 15). 
                                                 
3 They reflect the use of data up to the year to which the coeffi-
cient estimate applied, as is common in Bayesian information 
updating analysis. This shows the aggregate behavior that re-
sults from individual firms’ senior managers updating their 
reading on the appropriateness of SSO participation. 
The positive coefficients reveal that for the majority of 
the years, firms with higher net income or more organi-
zational slack were more likely to participate. The esti-
mated coefficient increased in 1996 (Year 9) and again in 
1998 (Year 11). Similar to R&DIntensity, the estimate 
began to stabilize in 1999 (Year 12). With the first in-
crease in 1996, there was no corresponding process-
related announcement, but the increase in 1998 coincided 
with the first official release of TOM.   
The relationship between FirmSize and the hazard 
rate showed the most change from 1994 to 1997 (Years 7 
to 10). For all the years from 1994 to 2000 with the mi-
nor exception of 1996 (Year 9), the estimate was posi-
tive. Thus, larger firms were more likely to join the in-
dustry SSO. The estimated coefficient experienced a 
sharp decrease in 1996 (Year 9 in our data set) and be-
came negative. Thereafter, it became positive again in 
1997 (Year 10).4 1997 was when TOM was introduced 
as part of the SMART TMN initiative. In 2003 (Year 
16), when eTOM became the de facto standard, the ha-
zard rate dropped. 
The relationship between FirmAge and the hazard 
rate changed the most from 1994 to 1996 (Years 7 to 9). 
It increased up to 1996 (Year 9) and stabilized. For all of 
the years minus 2006 and 2007 (Years 19 and 20), the 
hazard rate was negative. This suggests that less expe-
rienced firms were more likely to join the SSO than more 
experienced firms. The final variable we explored is Emp 
Efficiency. The relationship between EmpEfficiency and 
the hazard rate changed between positive and negative 
values during the study period. It increased in 1995, 1997 
and 1999 (Years 8, 10 and 12). These years had key 
process-related events. In 1995, the TM Forum an-
nounced the Service Management Business Process 
Model, the first authoritative work on telecom business 
process re-engineering, and the TOM was introduced in 
1997. In 1999, the SSO announced TOM Version 2, so 
the estimates make sense. 
5.2. Discussion 
 It was difficult to conclude if firms with higher 
R&D intensity were more likely to participate in an in-
dustry SSO. The TM Forum has a mixture of stakehold-
ers. Technology vendors have R&D spending; others 
(users and systems integrators) do not. So technology 
vendors are generally the dominant stakeholder in an 
SSO, which is why the hazard rate was mostly positive 
for the 14 years we analyzed. Firms undertaking R&D 
efforts are more likely to engage in cooperative arrange-
ments for innovation [16]. Cooperation is advantageous 
in that it minimizes the risks associated with innovation. 
                                                 
4 We are continuing our data analysis for this and the other 
variables to ensure that there are no anomalies that are damag-
ing the smoothness of the trajectory of the estimated Bayesian 
coefficient values.  
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 We find that firms with more slack were more likely 
to participate. Less slack indicates resource constraints. 
Firms with no slack have a difficult time in extending 
beyond a primary corporate objective [13]. Slack enables 
a firm to take on more risk, such as introducing new 
products and entering new markets [33]. It fosters a cul-
ture for experimentation and creative behavior since 
slack protects firms from uncertainty in new projects [3].  
Porter [34] states that firm size is a strong indicator 
of the scope of the firm’s operations and its power to 
influence industry structure. We expect very small and 
very large firms to have different SSO participation 
strategies. Large firms have much intellectual property, 
so they do not want to be put into sharing regimes unless 
they know they can control the outcome. For innovations 
that are new to market, large firms have a higher propen-
sity for cooperation [42]. Our data reveal that larger 
firms had a higher likelihood of SSO participation. Large 
firms’ ability to achieve economies of scale makes it 
difficult for smaller firms to compete against them. As a 
result, we expect large firms to leverage the same advan-
tage during standards development. 
The SSO participation strategies of more expe-
rienced firms were harder to predict. Their strategies may 
be more complex or less transparent. As co-opetition 
theory reveals, complexity “stirs up a fog.” On the other 
hand, less experienced firms had higher likelihood of 
participation all around. Employee efficiency did not 
reveal a trend; we are still trying to sort out why.  
6. CONCLUSION 
We used Bayesian information updating analysis to 
analyze the changing relationship between firm characte-
ristics and industry SSO participation strategies over a 
20-year period in order to understand firms’ co-opetition 
strategies in the presence of process standardization.  
6.1. Contributions 
Co-opetition, a business strategy that combines ele-
ments of cooperation and competition, is present during 
standards development. We posit that a firm’s co-
opetition strategy is revealed to some extent by when it 
elects to join an industry SSO. We studied organizational 
characteristics to discover what they reveal about firm 
SSO participation strategies. Using Bayesian information 
updating analysis, we showed how firms’ SSO participa-
tion strategies change when managers’ beliefs and uncer-
tainties are factored into decision-making. Firms are he-
terogeneous over time. The Bayesian analysis model 
allows us to estimate time-varying coefficients and ex-
amine how the relationship between the explanatory va-
riables and the firms’ participation strategies evolves.  
Our results reveal that SSO participation strategies 
of firms do change as an industry SSO matures and in-
formation is gradually revealed. The hazard rate exhibits 
more change in the early years when an SSO is young 
and a process standard is still in its early stages of devel-
opment. An interesting finding from our study is that the 
hazard rate stabilizes years before a standard becomes a 
de facto industry standard. We discovered that the hazard 
rate began to stabilize in 1999 (Year 12 of the timeline of 
our data observations) with the release of TOM Version 
2. This was five years before eTOM became a de facto 
standard. Possible explanations include firms’ rational 
expectations of the viability of a standard drives them to 
join, or an averaging effect of the beginning and ending 
behaviors of the firms. Another key finding is that R&D 
intensity fails to offer any strong insight into firm SSO 
participation strategy. This is surprising since a firm’s 
R&D goals are heavily tied to its standards goals. Addi-
tionally, we find that there is a positive relationship be-
tween firm likelihood to participate and key process-
related announcements. This confirms that when an SSO 
releases information regarding critical developments of a 
standard, it will affect firm SSO participation strategy.  
6.2. Limitations 
Our research has the following limitations. The first 
limitation is that our study is based on one industry SSO. 
Consequently, the findings may not be representative of 
all industry SSOs, which makes it difficult for us to ge-
neralize the results. Second, the sample consisted only of 
public firms since it was easier to obtain secondary data 
on publicly-traded firms, which means the results may 
not illustrate the behaviors of private firms. Additionally, 
we focused on firms in the United States only. The TM 
Forum is a global organization, and many of its members 
are from Europe and Asia. Because some regions may be 
more susceptible to contagion effects, participation strat-
egies can vary across the different regions.  
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